County-Level Determinants of Local Public Services in Appalachia: A Multivariate Spatial Autoregressive Model Approach by Gebremariam, Gebremeskel H. & Gebremedhin, Tesfa G.
County-Level Determinants of Local Public Services in Appalachia: A Multivariate 






Gebremeskel H. Gebremariam, Graduate Research Assistant 
 
Tesfa G. Gebremedhin, Professor 
 
Division of Resource Management 
Davis College of Agriculture, Forestry & Consumer Sciences 
P. O. Box 6108 
West Virginia University 










Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American 








Copyright 2006 by Gebremeskel Gebremariam and Tesfa Gebremedhin. All rights 
reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
 
  1County-Level Determinants of Local Public Services in Appalachia: A Multivariate 
Spatial Autoregressive Model Approach 
Abstracts: 
In this paper, a multivariate spatial autoregressive model of local public expenditure 
determination with autoregressive disturbance is developed and estimated. The empirical 
model is developed on the principles of utility maximization of a strictly quasi concave 
community utility function. The existence of spatial interdependence is tested using 
Moran’s I statistic and Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for both the spatial error and 
spatial lag models. The full model is estimated by efficient GMM following Kelejian and 
Prucha’s (1998) approach using county-level data from 418 Appalachian counties. The 
results indicate the existence of significant spillover effects among local governments 
with respect to spending in local public services. We also present the OLS estimates of 
the conventional (non spatial) model of local public expenditure determination and the 
corresponding maximum likelihood estimates of the spatial lag and the spatial error 
models for comparison purposes. We found that the GMM estimates are more efficient. 
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1. Introduction 
The public sector affects and interacts with the private sector and the economic 
well being of individuals in many ways. In an effort to create jobs, spur income growth, 
and enhance economic opportunities of their citizens more generally, state and local 
governments, for example, often offer newly locating or expanding business firms 
substantial financial incentives. The distribution of income, the overall price level, and 
the quality and quantity of public goods and services such as highways, education, health 
and other local public services are also affected by such local government activities as 
taxes, and public expenditure.  The level of public expenditure and tax revenue in turn are 
determined by the economic, demographic and political characteristics of the local 
economy. The differences in local public expenditures across regions are, therefore, 
generally explained by differences in county-level covariates such as  per capita incomes, 
  2population density, tax base, tax rates, population size, age structure of the population, 
grants in-aid from higher levels of governments, labor market characteristics, and school-
age population as well as other socio-economic and institutional factors.  
Although most empirical studies in the local public finance literature assume that 
the level of public expenditure in a jurisdiction is not affected by the expenditures in 
neighboring jurisdictions, both theory and causal observations, however, suggest that 
expenditure spillovers are a widespread feature of many services provided by local 
governments.   
In this paper, we develop an empirical model that incorporates expenditure 
spillovers into the conventional model of local public spending determination. We test 
the idea that county j’s local public spending is dependent on its neighbors’ spending on 
public services using county-level data from Appalachia. We define neighbors as those 
counties who share common geographic borders, although we recognize that economic or 
demographic similarities could also define neighborliness.  
The literature on the determinants of local public expenditure is given in section 
2.  Section 3 out lines the econometric model. We construct and develop a theoretical 
model of local public expenditure determination based upon the median-voter model of 
utility maximization. The basic model is expanded to incorporate spatial spillover effects. 
We also develop test statistics to test the existence of spatial dependences as well as to 
discriminate between the spatial lag and the spatial error dependences. The specification 
of the empirical models and issues related to their estimation are also discussed in this 
section. Description of the data and its sources is given in section 4. Section 5 presents 
the results and discussion. Finally, conclusion is given in section 6. 
  32. County-Level Determinants of Local Public Services 
The public sector affects and interacts with the private sector and the economic 
well being of individuals in many ways. The distribution of income, the overall price 
level, and the quality and quantity of public goods and services such as highways, 
education, health and other local public services are affected by such local government 
activities as taxes, and public expenditure.  The level of public expenditure and tax 
revenue in turn are determined by the economic, demographic and political 
characteristics of the local economy.   
Many cross-sectional studies exist in the literature trying to explain regional 
variations in per capital local public expenditures (Hawley, 1957; Brazer, 1959; Hirsch, 
1959; Hansen, 196; Henderson, 1968; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Ohls and Wales, 
1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro, 1982; Fisher 
and Navin, 1992). Hawley (1957), Brazer (1959), Hirsch (1959), and Hansen (1965), for 
example, employed a one-equation multiple-regression model to express per capita local 
public expenditure as a function of selected explanatory variables using cross-sectional 
data. Henderson (1968) also used a multiple-regression analysis of per capita cross-
sectional county data for the United States with two equations. Borcherding and Deacon 
(1972) estimated demand functions for eight specific public services: local education, 
higher education, highways, health and hospitals, police, fire, sewers and sanitation using 
cross-sectional data aggregated at state level. Using cross-sectional expenditure data for 
1968, Ohls and Wales (1972) also estimated the demand and cost functions for three 
broad categories of state and local public expenditure: expenditures on highways per 
capita, education expenditures per school-age population and local service expenditures 
  4per capita (including fire, police, sanitation, health and hospitals, and local utility 
expenditure).  
Similarly, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) employed multiple-regression analysis 
to estimate the demand functions for three categories of municipal services: police, parks 
and recreation, and total municipal expenditure excluding education and well fare. These 
studies are based on the median voter theory where individual demand functions are 
inferred from cross-sectional studies in which actual public expenditure by local 
governments are regressed on indicators of economic and social composition of the 
jurisdiction’s population. Bergstrom et al. (1982), however, devised and applied a method 
for estimating demand for local public goods, which does not require the median voter 
assumption. By combining individual’s responses from survey data to questions about 
whether they want more or less of various public goods with observations of their 
incomes, tax rates, and of actual spending in their home communities to obtain estimates 
of demand functions. 
The standard model in the literature assumes that differences in local public 
expenditures across regions are explained by differences in per capita incomes, 
population density, tax base, tax rates, population size, the age structure of the 
population, grants in-aid from higher levels of governments, labor market characteristics, 
and school-age population as well as other socio-economic and institutional factors.  
The results from the various studies show that the income elasticity of local public 
expenditure is positive and significant whereas the estimates of tax price elasticity are 
negative and significant (Henderson, 1968; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Ohls and 
Wales, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Bergstrom et al., 1982; Sanz and 
  5Velazquez, 2002; Painter and Bae, 2001). Studies by Randolph, Bogetic and Hefley, 
(1996), Canning and Pedroni (1999) and Fay (2000) also found that spending on 
economic services such as those relating to transport and communications respond 
primarily and directly to per capita income changes. Similarly, wide varieties of studies 
show that estimates of income elasticity greater than one for merit goods such as health, 
education and housing (Lue, 1986; Newhouse, 1987; Gertham, Sogaard, Jonsson and 
Andersson, 1992; Falch and Rattso, 1997; Snyder and Yachovlev, 2002; Hashmati, 
2001).  Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) analyzed the linkage between public infrastructure 
and regional development in a system of two equations and found that per capita real 
personal income has a positive and statistically significant contemporaneous effect on 
local public investment. 
The findings from the study by Painter and Bae (2001) indicates that income per 
capita, total long-term debt, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of students of 
college age have a positive and statistically significant impact on state government 
expenditure.  The results from this study and others (Randolph et al., 1996; Gertham et 
al., 1992; Falch and Rattso, 1997; Fay, 2000; Hashmati, 2001) also show that population 
density has negative coefficient. Population and its density play a highly important role in 
per capita spending on the purest or non-rival goods such as transportation and 
communications as well as merit goods and other economic services. A negative 
coefficient, thus, indicates the advantage economies of scale in the provision these public 
services. A small community must provide many public services such as education, 
hospitals, policy and sewage removal at relatively high per capita costs, which decline as 
its population increases. The reverse also holds true, large expenditures result in places 
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problems that small rural communities face. Larger communities usually have better 
taxable capacity, which can provide a broader range of services that a small community 
cannot or need not provide (Henderson, 1968).  
Since net migration changes the size and the density of population of a region, it 
has an impact on the demand of locally provided public goods and services as well as on 
the revenues that support the provision of these public goods and services. The mix of 
migrants or the mix of individuals who choose not to migrate may have profound 
consequences on the local public sector. A high-income in-migrant family, for example, 
may provide more tax revenue to the local economy than a low-income in-migrant 
family. The type and the quantity of public services they demand, however, are likely to 
be different. Similarly, growth in population of children that results from in-migrant 
families with children or women likely to have children creates big pressure on schools 
because the will be faced not only by the need to expand services but are also faced with 
the costs of expanding capacity.  At the same time excess capacity and very high costs 
associated with maintaining overstock of buildings in the areas of origin where school 
enrolment declined will be created.  The problems are exacerbated if out-migration is 
severe to impact property value and overall fiscal health (Charney, 1993). 
The population age structure is also a significant determinant of local public 
services and goods.  An increase in the proportion of the old and the young in a 
community increase spending in health, housing and social security (Heller, Hemming 
and Kalvert, 1986; Hagmann and Nicolleti, 1989; Di Matteo and Di Matteo 1998; Curie 
and Yelowtz, 2000). An increase in the proportion of young people will also generate 
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and Johansson, 2001). Local public expenditure per capita is also positively related to 
grants in-aid from higher-level governments (Fisher and Navin, 1992; Henderson, 1968). 
Although most empirical studies in the local public finance literature assume that 
the level of public expenditure in a jurisdiction is not affected by the expenditures in 
neighboring jurisdictions, both theory and causal observations suggest that expenditure 
spillovers are a widespread feature of many services provided by local governments. 
Spatial spillovers in public expenditure might be because of true policy interdependence 
between local governments or it might simply be due to the fact that local governments 
are hit by a spatially auto-correlated shocks.  Thus, local governments affect each other in 
their public spending decisions, and as Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) indicate, not 
accounting for such spillover effects would result in biased and inconsistent estimates of 
the parameters of an equation the demand for local public services. 
One way of explaining and testing the existence of spatial interactions among 
local governments is through the tax competition model. This model assumes that local 
governments finance public spending through a tax on mobile capital and since the level 
of tax base in a jurisdiction depends both on own and on other jurisdictions’ tax rates, 
strategic interactions results (Wildasin, 1986). Local governments are, thus, concerned 
about how their tax rates and local public expenditure compare with those of their 
neighboring jurisdictions. The reason for this concern could be the fear of driving away 
taxpayers and attracting welfare recipient from other jurisdictions if benefits are 
generous. Local governments may react to the actions of their neighbors asymmetrically 
or complementarily. The study by Figlio, Kolpin and Reid (1999) on a panel of United 
  8States states, for example, find that decentralized welfare benefit setting exacerbates 
inter-state competition that might induce states to respond to changes in their neighbor’ 
policies asymmetrically. In his study of California cities, Bruerckner (1998), however, 
finds that a city government raises land rent both in its own and in neighboring cities by 
restricting the amount of developable land, thereby generating an externality and strategic 
interaction in growth control decisions (policy interdependence).  
The other model that tries to explain and test the existence of spatial interactions 
among local governments is the externality or spill-over effect model. This model 
postulates that beneficial or harmful effect could spillover onto residents of neighboring 
jurisdiction from expenditures on local public service in a given jurisdiction. Using a 
model of spatially correlated random effect, Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), for example, 
find that states’ per capita expenditures are positively and significantly influenced by 
their neighbors’ spending and that omitting this spillover effect would result in biased 
estimates of the effects of other covariates on state spending. Using United States county-
level data, Kelejian and Robinson (1993) also find that police expenditures in a given 
county are positively and significantly influenced by neighboring counties’ expenditure 
on police. 
The third model that tries to explain and test the existence of spatial interactions 
among local governments is the “political agency – yardstick competition” model. This 
model postulates that imperfectly informed voters in a given jurisdiction use the 
performance of other governments as a yardstick to evaluate their own governments. 
Thus, local governments react to the actions of their neighbors in an effort not to get too 
far out of line with polices in other jurisdictions, resulting in local governments 
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agency – yardstick competition”. They tested their yardstick competition hypothesis on 
US states’ income taxes from 1960 to 1988 and find that geographic neighbors’ tax 
changes have a positive and significant effect on a given state’s tax change.  
3. Methodology 
3.1. The Model 
Following the studies by Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973), the median voter model will be used to analyze the determinants of the 
demand for local public services or the expenditures for local public services. In this 
model it is assumed that utility-maximizing citizens elect government by majority rule 
and that the size of the public sector is the only issue to be decided. Citizens are assumed 
to be informed about the costs and benefits of government expenditures and hence the 
median voter chooses the level of spending by voting for candidates who offer him/her 
the most efficient set of public services and taxes. Aggregating over individual in a 
community, a utility function that represents community preferences can be generated.  
Based on these assumptions, we develop a theoretical model in order to derive 
hypotheses on the determinants of public spending on local public services. The model is 
given by the following set of equations: 
  
         ( ) U = U G,INCTAXR;X        (1a) 
  ( ) DGEX = DGEX G,GF  (1b) 
                    ( ) REV = REV INCTAXR,PCTAX,PCPTAX,DFEG;X       (1c) 
                                                          REV  (1d)  = DGEX
  10Equation (1a) is the community utility function which is assumed to be strictly quasi-
concave over local public services (G), community income tax rate (INCTAXR), and also 
may depend on socio-economic, demographic and amenity variables (X). Equation (1b) 
is local government cost function, which depends on G and other local government 
functions (GF).  Equation (1c) represents local government revenue function, which is 
assumed to depend upon the community income tax rate (INCTAXR), the tax base that 
includes personal income tax (PCTAX) and property tax (PCPTAX), intergovernmental 
grants (DFEG) and a vector of other socio-economic, demographic and amenity variables 
(X). Equation (1d) is local government budget constraint, which states that local 
government revenue should equal to local government expenditure 
Maximizing the utility function given in (1a) with respect to G, GF and 
INCTAXR subject to (1b)-(1d), gives a local public services demand function of the form 
(all notation as before) 
   (2a)  ( G = G PCTAX,PCPTAX,DFEG;X)
Substituting in (4.b) gives the reduced form of local public services expenditure demand 
function 
  ( ) DGEX = DGEX PCTAX,PCPTAX,DFEG;X  (2b) 
Equation (2b) forms the basis of our empirical analysis. In order to reduce the effects of 
the large diversity found in the data used in empirical analysis, a multiplicative (log-
linear) form of the model is used. Such specification also implies a constant-elasticity 
form for the equilibrium conditions given in (2b). A log-linear (i.e., log-log) 
representation of this equilibrium condition can thus be expressed as: 
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DGEX = PCTAX × PCPTAX × DFEG × X
           ln DGEX = ln PCTAX + ln PCPTAX + ln DFEG + ln X       ( a)
where  are exponents with K being the total number of variables 
included in vector X. The log-linear specification has an advantage of yielding a log-
linear reduced form for estimation, where the estimated coefficients represent elasticities.  
Duffy-Deno (1998) and MacKinnon, White, and Davidson, 1983 also show that, 
compared to a linear specification, a log-linear specification is more appropriate for 
models involving population and employment densities. 
, ,   and ,  1,..., k abc x k K =
The empirical model that corresponds to equation (3a) can be expressed more 
compactly as follows: 
   (3b)  y=X β+u
where y is (Nx1) vector of the log of per capita local public expenditure, X is (NxK) 
matrix of explanatory variables in log,β  is (Kx1) vector of parameters to be estimated, 
and u is an error term that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed 
across the observations. Equation (3b), however, may not be correctly specified due to 
the presence of spatial autocorrelation in local public expenditures because of policy 
interdependence among local governments. A possible reason for policy interdependence 
in local public expenditure is the existence of spillover effects across jurisdictions. 
Commuters, for example, use public transportation, roads, recreation and cultural 
facilities in their working communities. Air pollution controls and sewage treatment 
enhance the environmental quality of neighboring jurisdictions, and educational and job 
  12training expenditures may lead to productivity gain in workplaces outside the community. 
The presence of spatial spillover demands the explicit modeling of the spatial 
interactions, by taking into account that local jurisdictions make their decisions 
simultaneously, and each local government takes its neighbors’ behavior into account 
when setting its own policy. Thus, equation (3b) should be extended to accommodate this 
spatial interdependence as follows: 
   y=  (3c)  ρWy+Xβ+u
where  y is an (Nx1) vector of observations on the dependent variable, Wy is the 
corresponding spatial lagged dependent variable for weights matrix W,  X is (Nx K) 
matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, u is an (n x 1) vector of error terms, 
ρ  is the spatial autoregressive parameter and β  is a (Kx1) vector of regression 
coefficients. The parameterρ  measures the degree of spatial dependence inherent in the 
data. As this model combines the standard regression model with a spatially lagged 
dependent variable, it is also called a mixed regressive-spatial autoregressive model 
(Anselin and Bera, 1998). 
Equation (3b) may not also be correctly specified due to spatial autocorrelation in 
the error term. Thus, a second way to incorporate spatial autocorrelation in a regression 
model is to specify a spatial process for the disturbance term. The disturbance terms in a 
regression model can be considered to contain all ignored elements, and when spatial 
dependence is present in the disturbance term, the spatial effects are assumed to be a 
noise, or perturbation, that is, a factor that needs to be removed (Anselin, 2001). For 
example, any spatially auto-correlated variable that has an influence on y and is omitted 
from the model will lead to a spatial dependence in the residual. Such spatial pattern in 
  13the residuals of the regression model may lead to the discovery of additional variables 
that should be included in the model. Local jurisdictions may also be subjected to shocks 
that affect their expenditure decisions, and are spatially auto-correlated – such as 
common shocks to income and tax base, that may result from central government 
regional policies or intermediate level of government fiscal policies. Spatial dependence 
in the disturbance term also violates the basic OLS estimation assumption of uncorrelated 
errors. Hence, when the spatial dependence is ignored, OLS estimates will be inefficient, 
though unbiased, the student t- and F-statistics for tests of significance will be biased, the 
R
2 measure will be misleading, which in turn lead to a wrong statistical interpretation of 
the regression mode (Anselin, Bera, Florax and Yoon, 1996). More efficient estimators 
can be obtained by taking advantage of the particular structure of the error covariance 
implied by the spatial process. The disturbance term is non-spherical where the off-
diagonal elements of the associated covariance matrix express the structure of spatial 
dependence. The spatial dependence in the disturbance term, thus, can be expressed using 
matrix notation as 
  β = + yX u  (3d) 
with 
      λ = + uW u ε  
where u is assumed to follow a spatial autoregressive process, with λ  as the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient for the error lag Wu, and ε is (Nx1) vector of innovations or 
white noise error, and the other notations as before. Equation (3d) is the structural form 
of the SAR model which expresses global spatial effects.  The corresponding reduced 
form of the model can be specified as 
  14   (3e)  ()
1 βλ
− =+ − yX I Wε
with the corresponding error covariance matrix given as 
  ( ) () ( ) () (
11 22 E σλ λ σλ λ )
1 − −− ′ ′′ =− − =− − u u IWIW IW IW  (3f) 
The structure in equation (3f) shows that the spatial error process leads to a non-zero 
error covariance between every pair of observation, but decreasing in magnitude with the 
order of contiguity. Note also that hetroskedasticity is induced in u, irrespective of the 
hetroskedasticity ofε, because the inverse matrices in equation (3f) yields non-constant 
diagonal element in the error covariance matrix. 
3.2. Diagnostics for Spatial Autocorrelation 
When there are no strong a priori theoretical reasons to believe that interdependences 
between spatial units arises either due to the spatial lags of the dependent variables or due 
to spatially autoregressive error terms, the standard approach is to model the system with 
both effects included (Anselin, 2003). There are, however, a number of diagnostic tests 
that can be applied to discriminate between the two forms of the spatial dependence 
described by equations (3c) and (3d). The most widely used diagnostic test for spatial 
dependence in a regression model is an application of the Moran’s I statistic to the 
residuals of an OLS regression. Given a row-standardized spatial weight matrix W 
Moran’s I on the OLS residuals of equation (3a) is given by:   








where e are the OLS residuals. Although Moran’s I statistic has great power in detecting 
misspecifications in the model (and not only spatial autocorrelation), it is less helpful in 
  15suggesting which alternative specification should be used. To this end, we use two sets of 
Lagrange Multiplier test statistics. 
The first set, LM-Lag and Robust LM-Lag, pertain to the spatial lag model as the 



























eW y eW e











where tr is the matrix trace operator,  ()
1
M IX X X X
− ′ ′ =−   and b is the OLS estimate of 
β  in equation (3a). 
 
The second set, LM-Error and Robust LM-Error), refer to the spatial error model as the 
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Both sets of Lagrange Multiplier test statistics are distributed as
2 χ with one degree of 
freedom. Note that the robust versions of the statistics are considered only when the 
standard versions (LM-Lag or LM-Error) are significant.  A rejection of the null 
hypothesis by LM-Lag and LM-Error test statistics, thus, requires the consideration of the 
robust versions of the statistics. 
3.3. Estimation 
The existence of spatial dependence in the data set is tested by Moran’s I test statistic. As 
shown in Table 2(see also Maps1 &2 in appendix), the Moran’s I statistic is highly 
significant an indication that spatial autocorrelation exists in our data set. Although 
Moran’s I statistic is powerful in detecting spatial misspecifications in our data, it could 
not, however, discriminate the form of the spatial dependence. This is done by the 
Lagrange Multiplier test statistics which are also summarized in Table 2. Since the ML-
Lag and ML-Error are highly significant which lead us to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of absence of spatial dependence, we have to consider the robust forms of the 
statistics. RML-Error is more significant than RML-Lag (p<0.0000 compared to 
p<0.0445). From this it can be inferred that the spatial error specification of the model is 
more appropriate. Such models can be estimated consistently by maximum likelihood 
estimator provided that the error terms are normally distributed. A number of studies 
have used this method (see Case, Rosen, and Hines 1993; Brueckner , 1998, 2000; 
Baicker, 2005;  Saavedra, 2000).  In this study, however, the normally distributed error 
term assumption upon which the maximum likelihood estimation is based is not fulfilled. 
The Jarque-Bera test statistic is highly significant (p<0.0000) which lead us to reject the 
null hypotheses of normally distributed error term. Besides, maximum likelihood 
  17estimation is computationally expensive and is subjected to the identification problem as 
a result of the need to estimate the too many parameters of the n x n disturbance 
covariance matrix from only cross-sectional data. Thus, maximum likelihood estimation 
may not give consistent and unbiased estimates of the parameters of the model.  
A better alternative is the use of instrumental variables, as suggested by Kelejian 
and Robinson (1993), Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Lee (2003). This approach is 
computationally easier to implement and it does not require distributional assumptions on 
the error term. Thus, we also estimate our model by generalized spatial two-stage least 
squares (GS2SLS) as a better alternative. To this end, the model is specified as a spatial 
autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances by incorporating both 
dependences. Thus, by combining equations (3c) and (3d), our empirical model for a 
cross-section of counties of Appalachia is expressed as:  
 
ρ β = ++ y Wy Xu
 (4) 
with 
  λ = + uW u ε  
 
where y is an (418x1) vector of direct local government expenditure per capita, Wy is the 
corresponding spatial lagged dependent variable for weights matrix W, X is (418x K) 
matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, ρ  is the spatial autoregressive 
parameter, β  is a (Kx1) vector of regression coefficients,  u is an (418x1) vector of error 
terms, that is assumed to follow a spatial autoregressive process, with λ  as the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient for the error lag Wu, and   is (418x1) vector of innovations or 
white noise error. We use a row standardized queen-based contiguity weights matrix W. 
ε
  18Since the right-hand side spatial lag dependent variable (Wy) is correlated with the error 
term, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cannot give consistent estimates of the parameters of 
equation (4) as it stands. The reduced form of the system in (4) is non-linear in 
parameters and can be given by: 
  ()() ()
11
nn n yI WX I W I W
1 ρ βρ λ
−− =− +− − ε
−  (5) 
 
Equation (5) cannot be estimated consistently by OLS either. 
Thus, we estimate the parameters of the model given in (4) using efficient GMM 
method following Kelejian and Prucha’s(1998).  In order to define the GMM estimator, 
we first rewrite equation (4) as follows: 
 
  = + yZ δ u  (6) 
with 
  λ = + uW u ε  
where   and  () = ZX , W y () ′ ′ ′ = δβ ,ρ .The GMM method identifiesδby a moment 
condition which is the orthogonality between the set of instruments H and the error term 
u given by: 
  ( ) E ′ = Hu 0 (7) 
 
where H is defined as a subset of the linearly independent columns of ( )
2 X,WX,W X . It 
is assumed that the elements of H are uniformly bounded in absolute value. Besides, H is 
full column rank non-stochastic instrument matrix (see Kelejian and Prucha (1999) for 
the description of its prosperities).  The GMM estimator is given by 
  19  () () ( ) () () ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ′ ′
-1
λλ λ λ δ =Z Z Z y  (8) 
where   () () () ()
1
H ˆˆ ˆˆ ,  and  H λλ λλ
− ′ ′ =− = − = ZP Z W Z yy Wy PH H H H . This is the result of 
the third step in the three step generalized moment procedure suggested by Kelejian and 
Prucha. In the first step, the parameter vector ( ) δ consisting of betas and rho [ ] , β ρ ′′ is 
estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS) using the instrument matrix H that consists 
of a subset of   , where X is the matrix that includes all control variables in 
the model, and W is a weight matrix. The disturbance term in the model is computed by 
using the estimates for betas and rho (
2 X,WX,W X
ρ ) from the first step. In the second step, this 
estimate of the disturbance term is used to estimate the autoregressive parameter lambda 
() λ  using Kelejian and Prucha’s generalized moments procedure. In the third step, a 
Cochran-Orcutt-type transformation is done by using the estimate for lambda () λ  from 
the second step to account for the spatial autocorrelation in the disturbance. The GS2SLS 
estimators for betas and rho (ρ ) are then obtained by estimating the transformed model 
using⎡ ⎣ as the instrument matrix as given in (8).  ⎤ ⎦
2 X,WX,W X
4. Data  
We estimate the model using cross-sectional data for Appalachian counties. The 
dependent variable is direct local government expenditure per capita. The data for the 
direct local government expenditure comes from U.S. Bureau of Census, Government 
Census 2002. We use population figures form Bureau of the Census, Population 
Estimates to calculate the per capita local government expenditures. 
  20The conditioning variables included in the model are the following: direct federal 
government expenditure and grants per capita (DFEG), per capital local income tax 
(PCTAX),  property tax per capita (PCPTAX),  long-term debt (LTD),  population 
density (POPD), percent of population between 5 and 17 years old (POP15_17), and 
percent of population above 65 years old (POP_65). All the conditioning variables are 
obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census. Grants and income taxes variables are 
measures of the resources available to local governments. Population density is measured 
as the ratio of county population to total county land area in square miles. It is included in 
the model in order to capture the possibility of potential congestion effects or scale 
economies in the provision of local public services. The provision of local public services 
may also be affected by the age structure of the county. The demographic variables, 
POP5_17 and POP_65, are included to account for these impacts of variation in age 
structures on the demand for local public services. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
of the model is given in Table 1 in the Appendix. 
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 3 which is given in the appendix presents the results from OLS, Maximum 
Likelihood, and Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares (GS2SLS) estimation of 
(3b), (3c), (3d) and (6) respectively. We use direct local government expenditure per 
capita of Appalachian counties for 2002 as the dependent variable. The exogenous 
variables of the models are for 2000. Since all the variables are measured in logs, the 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticites. The weights matrix used is queen-based 
contiguity spatial weights matrix. 
  21Column 2 of Table 3 presents the OLS estimation of the restricted model (rho=0 
and lambda =0) or the conventional linear model of local public services determination. 
This model is used to compute the test statistics for spatial dependence which are 
summarized in Table 2. The results for the spatial lag and for the spatial error model are 
given in column 3 and column 4 of Table 3, respectively. The fit of the model is 
increased when spatial effects are included. The proper measures of fit are the Log-
Likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz Criterion (SC). Compared 
to that of the OLS (37.96), the Log-Likelihood has increased to 47.74 (for spatial lag) and 
to 57.20 (for spatial error). Both the AIC and SC in both the spatial lag and the spatial 
error models have decreased in similar pattern compared to the OLS, compensating the 
improved fit for the added variable. The fact that spatial effects really matter in the 
specification of a model for the determination of local public spending is further 
confirmed by result of the Likelihood Ration (LR) test.  The LR test compares the null 
model (the restricted or no spatial effect) to the alternative (the unrestricted, either the 
spatial lag or the spatial error) model. It is distributed as 
2 χ  with one degree of freedom. 
The highly significant values of 19.57 and 38.49 confirm the strong significance of the 
autoregressive coefficient for the spatial lag and the spatial error models, respectively. 
The insignificant values of the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticty in the 
error terms of the models also suggest that heteroskedasticty is not a problem. The error 
terms, however, are not normally distributed as confirmed by the Jarque-Bera test 
statistic. Given our finite sample data, we cannot, thus, make inferences based on the 
maximum likelihood estimators. Thus, we discuss only the coefficients of the GS2SLS 
estimation. 
  22The results of the GS2SLS estimation of the full model (6) are presented in 
column 5 of Table 3. When both the spatial effects (spatial lag and spatial error) are 
included together in the full model, the spatial lag effect becomes negative and 
insignificant (rho =-0.113) indicating that it just captures spuriously the spatial error 
effect in the spatial lag model. The degree of correlation in the level of direct local public 
expenditure per capita between neighboring counties is measured by rho(p).This copy-cat 
effect indicate that, although insignificantly, an increase in county j’s neighbors 
expenditure leads to a decrease in county j’s expenditures. This could be because of the 
positive spillover effects of public services. Commuters, for example, use public 
transportation, roads, recreation and cultural facilities in their working communities. Air 
pollution controls and sewage treatment enhance the environmental quality of 
neighboring jurisdictions, and educational and job training expenditures may lead to 
productivity gain in workplaces outside the community. The existence of such positive 
spill over effects in neighboring counties reduces the need to invest in similar public 
services. This result also indicates that the “political agency – yardstick competition” 
model is not relevant in explaining the spatial interactions among local governments in 
Appalachia during the study period. The spatial error effect, however, is still positive and 
highly significant (lambda =0.125). This spatial effect measures the degree of correlation 
between neighbors’ errors. This could simply be due to the fact that local governments 
are hit by spatially auto-correlated shocks because of the geographic similarities of 
counties in Appalachia.  
Turning to the explanatory variables, the results indicate a positive and significant 
effect of population density on local public expenditure per capita, indicating that per 
  23capita local public expenditure increases with population density (absence of scale 
economies in the provision of local public services). This could be because of the fact 
that the threshold to exploit economics of scale in the provision of local public services 
has not yet reached. The elasticity is about 0.10.The coefficients for the demographic 
variables (POP5_17) and (POP_65) are insignificant although they have the expected 
signs. Normally, the proportion of school-age population is expected to increase local 
public expenditures whereas the proportion of elderly decreases it. 
      Direct federal government expenditure and grants (DFEG) has a statistically 
significant effect on the level of local public expenditures. The estimated coefficient on 
DFEG is 0.20. This is what is commonly called as ‘flypaper effect’ in the literature. The 
effect of per capita income tax was found to be statistically significant. The elasticity is 
about 0.44. Long-term debt and per capita property tax were, however, found to be not 
significant. 
6. Conclusions 
To investigate the impacts of spatial spillover effects in the determination of local public 
spending, we develop a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive 
disturbance. The model is estimated by Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares 
(GS2SLS) estimator using county-level data from Appalachia for the 2002 fiscal year. 
We also estimated the conventional (non spatial) model of local public expenditure 
determination by Ordinary Least Squares estimator and the spatial lag as well as the 
spatial error models by Maximum-Likelihood estimator.  
On the basis of the OLS estimates, we developed test statistics in order to test the 
existence of spatial lag or spatial error dependences in local public expenditure 
  24determination. Moran’s I test statistic indicates the existence of spatial dependence in our 
data set. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics further indicate that the spatial error 
model is more appropriate. Given our finite date set, we could not consistently estimate 
this model by maximum likelihood estimator because the basic assumption upon which 
the maximum likelihood estimation is based, normally distributed error terms, is not 
fulfilled as indicated by the Jarque-Bera test statistic. Since the GS2SLS estimator does 
not require a normal distribution on the error terms, it is more efficient under this 
circumstance. Thus, we interpreted only the coefficients of the model parameters from 
the GS2SLS estimator. 
We find that counties in the study area are not engaged in strategic interaction in 
the determination of local public expenditures. The coefficient on the spatial lag 
dependent variable is negative but insignificant, indicating the ‘copy-cat’ effect is not 
important. This result also indicates that the “political agency – yardstick competition” 
model is not relevant in explaining the spatial interactions among local governments in 
Appalachia during the study period. The coefficient on the spatial error variable is, 
however, positive and highly significant. This shows the positive interdependences in 
local public expenditures through spatial error process. This could simply be because of 
the fact that local governments at the county-level in Appalachia are hit by a common 
shock.  
The conditioning variables that are used in the model are similar to those found in 
the literature. We find that population density has positive and significant effect on local 
public expenditure per capita. We also found a positive and strong ‘flypaper effect’ and a 
positive and significant effect of per capita income taxes on per capita local public 
  25expenditure. The effects of the demographic variables and the long-term government debt 
variable, however, were found to be insignificant. 
The results are generally consistent with the findings in the literature, although 
most studies in U.S. are done at the state level. The application of county-level data to 
test the expenditure spillover effects in the determination of local public expenditure is 
one of the contributions of this paper. Knowledge of how governments at the county-
level behave with respect to the provision of local public services is important for fiscal 
sustainability.  It is also important to pool resources in order to finance the provision of 
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics         
Variables  Description   Mean     Std Dev      Minimum    Maximum
DGEX02  Direct Local Gov. Expenditure per Capita, 2002 7.84232 0.4929  6.6399 12.54322
WDGEX02  Spatial Lag of DGEX02  7.84624 0.2193 7.3985 8.96555
POPD  Population Density,  per Square mile,2000  4.28811 0.9115  1.846 7.74918
POP5_15  Percent of Population of School Age,2000  2.92443 0.12  2.1748 3.22287
POP>65  Percent of Elderly population,2000 2.64571 0.2027  1.5476 3.20275
DFEG  Per capita Grants from Higher Gov'ts,2002 7.98688 0.3758  6.9829 10.1766
PCTAC  Per Capita Personal Income Tax,2000  5.91452 0.5299  4.5074 7.42253
PCPTAX  Per Capita Property Tax,2000  5.5236 0.616  3.912 7.36265







TABLE2 :DIAGNOSTICS FOR SPATIAL DEPENDENCE 
FOR WEIGHT MATRIX : Appalachia.GAL  (row-standardized weights) 
TEST                          MI/DF      VALUE          PROB  
Moran's I (error)           0.208024     7.0024957      0.0000000 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag)       1       21.8573414      0.0000029 
Robust LM (lag)                 1        4.0357158      0.0445468 
Lagrange Multiplier (error)     1       43.7157959      0.0000000 
Robust LM (error)               1       25.8941704      0.0000004 
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TABLE 3: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Direct Local Government 
Expenditure Per Capita) 
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Log Likelihood  37.96  47.74  57.20  - 
Akaike inf. criterion  -59.91  -77.48  -98.40  - 
Schwarz criterion  -27.63  -41.17  -66.12  - 





Observations 418  418 418  418 













Map 2: Global Spatial Autocorrelation and Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation: 
Spatial Lag Dependent Variable 
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